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1. Introduction 
 
Several contributions in the financial literature show that corporate financing choices are like-
ly to be determined by a host of factors that are related not just to the characteristics of the firm, 
but also to the institutional environment where the latter operates (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2008; Cheng and Shiu, 2007; Lopez-
Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz, 2007; Utrero-González, 2007; Bianco et al., 2005; Giannetti, 
2003; Titman et al., 2003; Booth et al., 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Most of this research 
uses cross-country data to examine large firms facing a wide range of institutional environ-
ments, while recent works highlight differences in institutional settings at local level (e.g. 
Guiso et al., 2004). The latter claim that, within a single country, local institutional differences 
can exist and might play a crucial role in determining corporate financial decisions. One of the 
local institutional characteristics that has received increasing interest from scholars is the de-
gree of financial development. Indeed, local financial markets may be of great relevance in af-
fecting firms’ capital structure, especially when firms cannot realize the benefits of moving to 
the international capital market or they consider it too costly and not easily accessible.  
Besides, several studies highlight the role of judicial enforcement in shaping the functioning 
of a financial system, hence in affecting financing decisions (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Beck 
and Levine, 2004). Indeed, judicial enforcement is important as the regulations governing the 
financial system work in the interest of investors, protecting creditors only to the extent that the 
rules are actually enforced. Due to the risk of default and the difficulty to get back the liquida-
tion value of the collateral, enforcement affects the ex-ante availability of agents to provide fi-
nance. Likewise, as recent contributions point out (e.g. Utrero-González, 2007; Giannetti, 
2003), by fostering financial market development, enforcement and investors’ protection con-
tribute to mitigate agency problems.  
Inspired by the above literature, the present note investigates whether and to what extent the 
financial decisions of small and medium sized firms (henceforth SMEs) are influenced by the 
degree of local financial development. We evaluate this relationship both ceteris paribus, and 
by allowing the impact of the provincial financial development to be conditional on different 
levels of local legal enforcement inefficiency. Thus, our work distinguishes itself from the ex-
tant literature as – in studying SMEs financial choices – it focuses on local instead of country 
factors, and it allows for interaction among different institutional features.  
Focusing on SMEs is relevant since, as shown by several contributions, the influence of lo-
cal institutional factors on capital structure decisions is particularly relevant for such firms. For 
example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) highlight that institutional factors have a dif-
ferent impact on SMEs’ financial policies, compared to those of larger firms. Further, Beck et 
al. (2005) point out that market imperfections, such as those caused by underdeveloped finan-
cial and legal systems, constrain funding decisions depending on firms’ size. 
To carry out the empirical analysis we employ Italian data. Italy provides an ideal laboratory 
to test the effect of local institutional factors on SMEs capital structure for at least two reasons. 
First, the Italian economy is dominated by SMEs. Secondly, it is widely documented that the 
efficiency of both financial and legal enforcement systems is quite dissimilar across the Italian 
local areas, despite a financial system and a legal/regulatory framework highly integrated and 
uniform. Following Guiso et al. (2004), we consider as local markets the 103 existing Italian 
administrative provinces (geographic entities very similar to the US counties).  
The remainder of the work is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review 
of the literature on the effects of local financial development on firms’ capital structure. Section 
3 illustrates the econometric specification and the methodology adopted. Section 4 describes 
the data. Section 5 discuses the results obtained, and section 6 concludes. 
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2.  Capital structure, financial development and enforcement at local level: from 
the extant literature to our testing hypotheses 
 
Capital structure is a controversial topic in academia and in the business community (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). There is a growing interest in empirically studying the connection be-
tween institutions and firms’ capital structure to understand debt versus equity choices 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). The main literature is based on cross-country anal-
yses emphasizing the effects of institutional differences on capital structure (Titman et al., 
2003; Booth et al., 2001; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999), and showing that financing 
decisions are shaped both by a country’s legal and financial environment (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Specifically, the re-
search on the relationship between law and finance takes into account the role of institutional 
factors, such as the efficiency of financial and enforcement systems (Lopez-Iturriaga and Ro-
driguez-Sanz, 2007; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; La Porta et al., 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1996). Institutions that work efficiently can reduce problems of opportunism and 
asymmetric information, with significant effects on the relative magnitude of the costs and ben-
efits associated to debt. 
 The impact of financial development on financing decisions is becoming a major research 
priority considering that, as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998), financial development fa-
cilitates firms’ growth, affecting capital structure decisions through the reduction of external fi-
nancing costs. Although previous studies are based on cross-country analysis (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2008; Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz, 2007; Utrero-
González, 2007; La Porta et al., 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 1995), it may also be that, within a 
single country, differences in companies’ financial structure are explained by differences in the 
degree of financial development at the local level. There is increasing evidence in the finance 
literature that the local context is relevant. Recent financial papers (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; 
Petersen and Rajan, 2002) highlight the importance of distance in explaining the availability 
and pricing of bank loans. In particular, Petersen and Rajan (2002) document the importance of 
distance in the provision of bank credit to small firms, especially in countries where asymmet-
ric information problems are substantial. Studies on the local context are also close to contem-
porary debates in the economic geography literature, interested in understanding firm’s financ-
ing across different regional contexts (Martin, 1999). Pollard (2003) suggests the need of con-
textualizing firm finance, analyzing how different geographical configurations of financial in-
stitutions affect the access to credit for firms operating locally. In general, it is suggested that 
banks operating locally have more knowledge and control on local firms and entrepreneurs 
(Alessandrini and Zazzaro, 1999). As highlighted by Diamond (1993) and Flannery (1986), the 
existence of asymmetric information is likely to tilt capital structures toward a higher use of 
debt. According to Titman et al. (2003), key determinants of the financial constraint, influenc-
ing firm’s capital-structure, may be the existence of asymmetric information and the cost of 
contracting between companies and potential providers of external financing. Financial con-
straints are likely to be more severe in the presence of a poorly developed financial system. By 
contrast, a well-developed financial system can facilitate the ability of a company to gain ac-
cess to external financing, providing cheaper finance to worthy companies (Guiso et al., 2004).  
In the light of the above considerations, a first hypothesis we assess empirically is stated as 
follows:  
 
(hypothesis 1) across different local areas, an increase in financial development is assumed – 
ceteris paribus – to allow for a higher use of debt.  
 
In addition to the function performed by the financial system, the literature suggests to ac-
count also for the role of judicial enforcement in shaping the operation of a financial system, 
and so in affecting financing decisions (see Beck and Levine, 2004, for a review). In particular, 
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the law and finance theory focuses on the role of legal institutions and enforcement in explain-
ing international differences in financial development (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Beck and 
Levine, 2004). The judicial enforcement is important because the regulations governing the fi-
nancial system work in the interest of investors, protecting creditors only to the extent that the 
rules are actually enforced. Due to the risk of default and the difficulty to get back the liquida-
tion value of the collateral, enforcement affects the ex-ante availability of agents to provide fi-
nance. As suggested by La Porta et al. (1998), because a good legal environment protects po-
tential financiers against expropriation by entrepreneurs, it raises their willingness to provide 
funds to firms. Thus, as recent contributions highlight (e.g. Utrero-González, 2007; Giannetti, 
2003), by fostering financial market development, enforcement and investors’ protection con-
tribute to mitigate agency problems. The role of legal institutions and enforcement in explain-
ing international differences in financial development across countries (Beck and Levine, 2004) 
can also apply with regards to within-country analyses: the efficiency of the courts at local level 
can be different although the same law applies. By providing diverse levels of creditors’ protec-
tions, the existence of differences in the quality of the enforcement at local level affects local 
financial development. As suggested by the law and finance view, local financial development 
would be higher where judicial enforcement is more effective, while the financial support to 
firms would be lower where the quality of the legal system is weaker. On the base of these ar-
gumentations, a second hypothesis of our empirical analysis is that:  
 
(hypothesis 2) the higher the local judicial costs the lower the impact of local financial devel-




3. Empirical question and econometric methodology 
 






it 4 3 2 1 t , i 1 it T X JUDCOST * BRANCH JUDCOST BRANCH LEV LEV ε ϕ φ β β β β α + + + + + + + = ∑ −            (1) 
 
where indices i and t refer to individuals and time periods, respectively. The dependent variable 
(LEV) is calculated as the ratio of financial (or interest-bearing) debt (excluding trade debt) to 
the total financial debt plus equity (as in Titman et al. 2003, Giannetti 2003, Rajan and Zingales 
1995). On the right hand side, BRANCH and JUDCOST are our measures of local financial 
development and inefficiency of the legal system, respectively.  
Following Benfratello et al. (2008), BRANCH is the provincial branch density (calculated as 
bank branches on population). The authors indicate at least two motivations to choose this vari-
able as a measure of the level of local banking development. A first one is that it is widely used 
in the studies on local banking development (e.g. Degryse and Ongena, 2005). A second one, 
and perhaps more important, is that “it captures the dimension of banking development that is 
likely to be more heavily affected by the deregulation process” (Benfratello et al. 2008, p.200), 
a process that greatly contributed to transform the physiognomy of the Italian banking system 
in the last two decades. Similarly to Fabbri and Padula (2004) and Bianco et al. (2005), JUD-
COST is the ratio of backlog of pending civil trials to incoming civil trials.
1 The hypothesis un-
derlying the use of this variable is that the quality of the legal enforcement system at local level 
depends inversely on the congestion of the judicial district.  
                                                 
1 The computation of JUDCOST relies on the trials at the first degree of judgment (lower court). However, as a 
robustness check (sub-section 5.1), we have also considered the trials at the second degree of judgment (appeal 
court). Data on pending and incoming trials are available at judicial districts level only, these latter correspond-
ing roughly to the Italian regions (for a matching of judicial districts with regions and provinces, see Fabbri and 
Padula 2004).   
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The vector X of control variables accounts for observable firm-specific characteristics. Theo-
retical and empirical studies have shown that features such as size, age, profitability, non-debt 
tax-shields, tangibility, trade debt and growth opportunities are likely to affect capital structure 
(e.g. Hall et al., 2004; Van der Wijst and Thurik,1993). Large firms tend to have more collateral-
izable assets and more stable cash flows (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Harris and Raviv,1991). 
Thus, the variable SIZE_E, measured by the number of firm’s employees, is included in the 
model. To account for informational opacity across the different stages of a firm’s life cycle, 
the AGE variable is added. Most tax and asymmetric information models of capital structure 
predict a relationship between leverage and profitability (Rajan and Zingales,1995; Harris and 
Raviv, 1991). Thus, our empirical model includes the return on assets (ROA), expressed as the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets. De Angelo and Masulis (1980) 
argue that firms that are able to reduce taxes using methods other than deducting interest, such 
as depreciation, will employ less debt in their capital structure. The non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS) variable considered in this study is measured through the depreciation and amortiza-
tion of tangible and intangible assets divided by total assets (MacKie-Mason,1990). Tangible 
assets (TGASS) may provide collateral for loans, reducing agency costs and the cost for lend-
ers, and thus are expected to be associated with higher leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988). Firms with high growth opportunities may retain financial flexibil-
ity through a low leverage to be able to exercise those opportunities in subsequent years (My-
ers,1977), while a firm with outstanding debt may forgo such opportunities (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976). To capture this effect, we use a measure of firm’s growth (FGROW_S), given by 
the growth rate of annual net sales. Considering that trade debt may be a substitute for bank 
debt (De Blasio, 2005), the TRADE variable – expressed by the ratio of trade debt to total as-
sets – is also included. Vector X also comprises industry dummies (PAV), to control for hetero-
geneity at sectoral level, two variables at provincial level – the (log of) per capita real gross 
domestic product (GDPPC) and the ratio of bad loans to total loans (BAD), this latter as a 
proxy for credit market riskiness – and a territorial dummy (SOUTH), to account for the dual-
ism in the degree of socio-economic development between Center-North and South (this varia-
ble is coded 1 for firms located in the southern regions, and zero otherwise).
2 Besides, Tt is a set 
of time fixed effects and it i it u + =ν ε  is a composite error, where the individual effect (vi) sum-
marizes unobserved firm’s characteristics that are time-invariant, and have been acknowledged 
as potential determinants of capital structure decisions (Lemmon et al., 2008; Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006). The second term (uit) captures idiosyncratic shocks to leverage. Finally, it is 
worth highlighting the inclusion of lagged leverage as an explanatory variable. This term ena-
bles us to account for the dynamics suggested by the literature on the capital structure adjust-
ment process (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Welch, 2004; Fama and 
French, 2002; Bontempi and Golinelli, 1996).
3  
To test our first hypothesis, we estimate equation (1) without considering the interaction 
term between BRANCH and JUDCOST. Then, to verify our second hypothesis, we estimate 
model (1) – which makes the effect of financial development conditional on different levels of 
enforcement inefficiency. Specifically, we consider the partial effect of BRANCH conditional 
                                                 
2 It is worth underlining that the two biggest Italian macro-areas differ also in term of institutional environment.  
Indeed, as pointed out by several contributions (see, for instance, Fabbri e Padula, 2005, Bianco et al., 2005, 
Carmignani and Giacomelli, 2009) the quality of judicial enforcement is worse in the southern regions of Italy, 
while the most efficient judicial districts are localised in the North of the country. This discrepancy emerges also 
from our data: in the period 1998-2003, the average value of JUDCOST tends to increase moving from the north 
to the south of the country, being the lowest (1.28) for Vercelli (a province belonging to the northern region 
Piemonte), and the highest (4.67) for Crotone (in the southern region Calabria).   
3 Summary statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables employed in the estimations are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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on the level of judicial costs ( JUDCOST * ˆ ˆ BRANCH / LEV 4 2 β β + = ∂ ∂ ), and the relative standard 
errors.
 4 
 Since both are dependent on JUDCOST, the marginal effect of BRANCH may change 
sign and gain or lose significance according to the value of the enforcement variable. To pro-
vide a concise report on these figures, we will graph the marginal effect of BRANCH - along 
with its 95% (or 90%) confidence intervals - across the range of the JUDCOST regressor. 
From an econometric perspective, controlling for leverage inertia and unobserved heteroge-
neity poses two major problems. The first concerns the correlation between the lagged depend-
ent variable and the past idiosyncratic errors. The second involves the potential correlation be-
tween fixed effects and regressors. This latter link makes the strict exogeneity assumption fail, 
compromising the consistency of the most popular methods employed in a static panel data set-
ting (random effects, fixed effects and first differencing). Moreover, in model (1) the lag of the 
leverage measure is not the only endogenous variable. In fact, also other explanatory variables 
are likely to be endogenous.
5 
A general approach for coping with the above mentioned problems consists of two steps. 
First the data are transformed in order to eliminate the unobserved individual effects, and then 
valid instrumental variables are employed in order to deal with the endogeneity problem. Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) propose a GMM procedure, exploiting the entire set of internal instru-
ments that the model generates, under the assumption of white noise errors. When the explana-
tory variables are persistent over time, however, the lagged level may result in poor instru-
ments. Since our variables of interest (BRANCH and JUDCOST) display little variation over 
time, in what follows we adopt the so-called system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator employs extra orthogonality conditions 
that “remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been shown to perform well in 
simulations” (Bond et al. 2001, page. 4), increasing the efficiency of the estimation.  
 
 
4. Data  
 
The econometric analysis is based on data coming from several sources. Information on Ital-
ian manufacturing firms is drawn from Capitalia’s 7
th, 8
th and 9
th surveys (Indagini sulle Im-
prese Manifatturiere), conducted on all Italian manufacturing firms employing more than 500 
workers and on a stratified sample of firms with more than 10 workers. Each of these surveys, 
including mostly qualitative information, spans three years: the 7
th survey, carried out in 1998, 
reports data for a panel of 4,493 firms for the period 1995-1997; the 8
th one was conducted in 
2001 and has data for a panel of 4,680 firms for the years 1998-2000, and the 9
th, in 2004, on 
4,289 firms for the period 2001-2003. Capitalia provides also balance-sheet data on the firms 
included in the surveys. By matching qualitative and accounting information, we obtain an un-
balanced panel of 5,998 firms for the period 1995-2003, for a total of 25,530 observations. As 
abovementioned, we focus on SMEs. Therefore, we drop firms with more than 250 workers 
and those listed on the Stock Exchange.  
A second data source, which gives us figures on the territorial distribution of branches for 
each Italian bank, is provided by the Bank of Italy. From the same database we draw infor-
mation on banks’ non-performing loans and banks’ total loans (both at provincial level), to 
                                                 
4 Formally, the latter are:  ) ˆ , ˆ cov( * JUDCOST 2 ) ˆ var( * ) JUDCOST ( ) ˆ var( ˆ 4 2 4
2
2 β β β β σ + + =    
5 We treat as endogenous the variables that are likely to be determined simultaneously along with the leverage 
(BRANCH, BRANCH* JUDCOST, SIZE, ROA, NDTS, TGASS, TRADE, FGROW_S and BAD). The remain-
ing regressors are treated as exogenous.  
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compute the BAD variable. Finally, data on pending and incoming civil trials, GDP and popu-




5. Empirical Results 
 
The SYS-GMM results are reported in Table 1. Column 1 shows the results of our model 
when excluding the variable JUDCOST (and therefore also its interaction with BRANCH).
7 
Figures show that the estimated coefficient of BRANCH is positive and statistically significant 
(at 10% level). Moreover, many control variables are statistically significant and their estimated 
coefficients are generally consistent with those found in previous studies. For instance, SIZE 
has a positive and statistically significant effect on leverage: larger firms seem to obtain more 
financial resources in terms of debt. The variable ROA has a negative and statistically signifi-
cant effect on leverage, suggesting that higher profitability - possibly mitigating problems of 
asymmetric information in accessing capital markets - may allow managers to be less depend-
ent on creditors for financial resources. The NDTS parameter is negative and statistically sig-
nificant as well; thus, managers seem to prefer reducing debt when it is possible to use non-debt 
tax shields.  
 
 
TABLE 1 - Estimation results. Dynamic panel-data estimation. One-step system GMM 
 
In Italics are reported the p-values of the tests. Standard errors (not reported) are consistent in the presence of 
any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels. For the description of the variables see 
section 3. GROUP (in column 3) is a dummy variable which is one if a firm belong to a group and zero other-
wise. FGROW_E (in column 4) is the annual growth rate of firm's employees. SIZE_TA/E (in column 5) is 
the ratio of total assets to the number of firm's employees. JUDCOST_2 (in column 6) is the ratio of backlog 
of pending civil trials to incoming civil trials (first and second degree of judgement). The variables 
SIZE_TA/E, AGE(+1) and GDPPC are in natural logarithms. Constant and time dummies included but not 
reported. AB test (AR1)-FD and AB test (AR2)-FD stand for Arellano-Bond test for AR in first differences 
and Arellano-Bond test for AR in second differences, respectively. 
 
   DEPENDENT VARIABLE (LEV) 




















LEV_1  0.558  0.555  0.551  0.559  0.557  0.556 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
BRANCH  0.784  1.992  2.092  2.446  1.903  2.283 
   0.082  0.087  0.070  0.039  0.074  0.064 
JUDCOST    3.263  3.679  4.955  3.243 
     0.263  0.204  0.102  0.215 
JUDCOST_2    4.027 
     0.185 
BRANCH*JUDCOST    -0.567  -0.642  -0.889  -0.557 
     0.290  0.228  0.110  0.246 
BRANCH*JUDCOST_2    -0.706 
     0.204 
SIZE_E  0.046  0.050  0.048  0.039  0.050 
   0.000  0.000  0.001  0.005  0.000 
                                                 
6 To moderate the influence of potential outliers, for each variable involved in the econometric analysis, the ob-
servations lying in the first and last percentile of the distribution have been dropped.  
7 The estimates are obtained by using a subset of the available instruments. This is because, as Altonji and Segal 
(1994) point out, the use of all instruments implies small-sample downward bias of the coefficients and standard 
errors. Further reducing the number of instruments - or using all those available - does not affect our main re-
sults.  
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TABLE 1 (continued) - Estimation results. Dynamic panel-data estimation. One-step system GMM 



















SIZE_TA/E    5.077 
     0.000 
AGE  -0.202  -0.214  -0.118  0.045  0.070  -0.215 
   0.528  0.509  0.727  0.892  0.811  0.507 
ROA  -0.278  -0.286  -0.296  -0.267  -0.227  -0.287 
   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.008  0.001 
NDTS  -1.023  -1.150  -1.126  -1.034  -0.883  -1.157 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
TGASS  0.254  0.235  0.229  0.251  0.261  0.236 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
FGROW_S  -0.125  -0.140  -0.124  -0.097  -0.139 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.007  0.000 
FGROW_E    -0.098 
     0.114 
TRADE  0.317  0.315  0.309  0.317  0.313  0.315 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
GROUP    0.779 
     0.498 
PAV2  -0.887  -0.717  -0.821  -0.997  -1.145  -0.710 
   0.038  0.098  0.061  0.021  0.011  0.101 
 
PAV3  -0.790  -0.815  -0.880  -0.752  -0.240  -0.801 
   0.048  0.042  0.030  0.064  0.548  0.046 
PAV4  1.791  1.890  1.813  1.940  2.151  1.902 
   0.029  0.022  0.030  0.020  0.009  0.022 
GDPPC  -2.277  -3.218  -3.489  -3.579  -3.571  -3.246 
   0.169  0.101  0.073  0.073  0.063  0.092 
BAD  -0.065  -0.135  -0.157  -0.207  -0.150  -0.143 
   0.530  0.289  0.213  0.117  0.217  0.253 
SOUTH  0.423  0.175  0.023  -0.360  -0.728  0.089 
   0.749  0.892  0.986  0.782  0.578  0.945 
N.obs  12,942  12,942  12,919  12,514  12,651  12,942 
F-test (BRANCH, INT)    2.61  2.55  2.57  2.32  2.67 
     0.074  0.079  0.077  0.099  0.070 
F-test (BRANCH, JUDCOST, INT)    2.51  2.44  2.17  2.36  2.41 
     0.057  0.062  0.089  0.070  0.065 
Model-test  120.09    110.41  106.45  115.02  107.17  110.27 
     0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AB test (AR1)-FD  -12.62  -12.75  -12.64  -12.08  -12.75  -12.74 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AB test (AR2)-FD  1.02  1.03  0.97  0.94  1.10  1.03 
   0.306  0.303  0.333  0.345  0.271  0.304 
Hansen test   268.29  292.8  317.0  281.4  305.2  293.3 
   0.180  0.220  0.192  0.382  0.102  0.214 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exog-
eneity of instrument subsets: GMM 
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Column 2 of Table 1 reports the estimates of model (1). Looking at the individual sign and 
significance of our key variables, the BRANCH estimated parameter appears positive and sig-
nificantly related to leverage. Given the presence of the interaction term, though, such a posi-
tive effect corresponds to the marginal effect of BRANCH only when the JUDCOST variable 
is equal to zero, which clearly does not represent a noteworthy case. The JUDCOST estimated 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Again, given the inclusion of the interaction term, this 
means that our legal enforcement indicator does not influence the dependent variable when the 
number of branches is zero, another meaningless case. The interaction term (BRANCH*JUD-
COST) is not statistically significant. An F-test, however, supports the hypothesis of joint sig-
nificance of BRANCH and its interaction term.
 The negative sign of the latter indicates that, as 
expected, the positive BRANCH effect tends to decrease as JUDCOST raises. However, these 
figures do not convey full information on the magnitude, sign and significance of the marginal 
effect of BRANCH (neither of JUDCOST). Since we are interested in appraising whether the 
BRANCH’s effect on leverage is different in magnitude and significance according to the level 
of JUDCOST, we have to consider the estimated marginal impact of BRANCH and its confi-
dence intervals for all JUDCOST values. Being the latter a continuous variable, it is useful to 















































0 1 2 3 4 5
Judcost
 
-----  90% Confidence Intervals
 
Marginal Effect of BRANCH as JUDCOST changes
 
                                          91.1% of the observations 
 
According to the above graph, the influence of financial development on the amount of 
SMEs’ debt is indeed dependent on the judicial system efficiency. At low levels of judicial 
costs, the BRANCH estimated marginal effect is positive and statistically significant (the con-
fidence band does not include the zero line). When such costs increase, the impact of 
BRANCH decreases, turning to be statistically not significant beyond a threshold value of 
about two. More than 91% of our sample observations fall within the significance region.  
Summarizing, our evidence suggests that the degree of local financial development is a sta-
tistically significant determinant of SMEs’ capital structure decisions, but its relevance decreas-
es at higher level of local courts inefficiency.  
 
 
5.1 Robustness Checks 
We first check the sensitivity of our results to the specification adopted. Results do not sub-
stantially change neither when controlling for non-linearity of firms’ size and age (i.e. the 
squares of SIZE_E and AGE are added to equation (1)), nor when including the (log of) pro-
vincial population. Findings are robust also when controlling for the local credit market size by 
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using the (log of) deposits in the province. Besides, none of the added variables is statistically 
significant. These results are not reported to avoid cluttering, but they are available from the au-
thors upon request. 
Similarly, the outcome remains substantially unaltered both when we include in the equation 
(1) a dummy variable (GRUP) to control for group membership (column 3 of Table 1), and 
when we replace some controls with other ones. In column 4 of Table 1, firm’s growth is 
measured in terms of number of employees (FGROW_E), rather than net sales (FGROW_S); in 
column 5, the number of firms’ employees is replaced by the log of total assets per employee 
(SIZE_TA/E); in column 6 JUDCOST is replaced with JUDCOST2, the latter being the ratio of 
backlog of pending civil trials to incoming civil trials (first and second degree of judgment).  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
 
This study has analyzed the influence of institutional differences at the local level on Italian 
SMEs’ capital structure choices, taking into account the interaction between local financial de-
velopment and the effectiveness of the local enforcement system. Controlling for financial debt 
inertia, endogeneity problems and firms’ heterogeneity, local financial development appears to 
exert a significant role in affecting SMEs’ debt capacity, conditioned by the quality of the local 
enforcement system.  
According to our main findings, corporate financial decisions seem to be not only the result 
of firm/ industry specific characteristics, but also a by-product of the institutional environment 
in which firms operate. Thus, despite the international process of capital markets integration, 
the local institutional context still seems to matter for Italian SMEs. In particular, higher levels 
of local financial development appear associated to easier access to external financial resources.  
Further, a more efficient local judicial system appears to amplify the positive relationship 
between financial development and firms’ capital structure, possibly as intermediaries may be 
more inclined to provide funds where the enforcement system enables a more effective credit 
protection. In other words, higher quality of the local enforcement system shows a relevant in-
direct effect on firm’s financial decisions, allowing SMEs to obtain credit more easily. Where 
local enforcement system is more efficient, banks may be less frightened of firms exhibiting 
opportunistic behaviour; vice versa, if it is difficult to enforce loan covenants, bankers could 
prefer to provide less credit - being scared of ex-post opportunistic problems. 
Broadly speaking, our study suggests that it may be relevant to jointly consider financial de-
velopment and enforcement at local level as crucial determinants of SMEs’ capital structure 
decisions. Thus, a policy implication of our results is the need to improve local financial devel-
opment, while considering that the way financial system affects firms’ decisions is qualified by 
the local courts’ efficiency. Indeed, an improvement in the local enforcement system can play 
an important role in creating the conditions for better relationships between firms and banks, 
mitigating asymmetric information problems, hence increasing credit availability for entrepre-
neurships. 
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